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TOWARD CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISCLOSURE: NRDC V. SEC 
Fern L. Frolin* 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate accountability to shareholders and the public was orig-
inally established by the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act)1 and 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).2 Congress in-
tended this legislation to improve the conduct of public corpora-
tions, at least in relation to the persons who invested in them.3 This 
goal is accomplished through corporate disclosure under regulations 
promulgated and enforced by the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC).4 Traditionally, regulated disclosure affected only financial 
information, but in recent years the SEC has also required limited 
non-financial policy disclosure.5 Increased social policy disclosure 
would enable socially-concerned investors to utilize policy informa-
tion in investment decisionmaking. Simultaneously, publicity 
would have an important prophylactic effect on corporate behavior.6 
Like the securities laws, the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA)7 uses disclosure to achieve both informational and behav-
ioral goals. NEPA, which Congress enacted to restore and maintain 
environmental quality,S is a broad policy statement rather than a 
* Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
I 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. (1970). 
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (1970). 
3 See L. BRANDEIS, OrnER PEoPLE'S MONEY 62 (1933). 
• 15 U.S.C. § 778(a) (1970). 
• Cf. Hetherington, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate 
Responsibility, 21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 262 (1969). 
• Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-Changing Concepts of Liability, 24 Bus. LAW. 43, 44 
(1968). 
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331 et seq. (1970). 
• [d. 
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regulatory enabling act. 9 It establishes environmental protection as 
a major national prioritylO and requires each federal agency to carry 
out the NEPA policies "to the fullest extent possible."ll It imposes 
on the agencies the obligation to "use all practicable means, consis-
tent with other essential considerations of national policy" to 
achieve the optimum range of environmental benefits.12 To this end, 
NEPA specifically requires that "major federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality .of the human environment" be accompanied 
by a detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) disclosing the 
potential effects of the proposed activity.13 These requirements may 
mean that the SEC must give special attention to corporate envi-
ronmental impact; i.e., promulgate substantive regulations requir-
ing environmental disclosure by publicly owned corporations. 
Although the courts have definitively construed NEPA's disclo-
sure requirements for agencies whose licensing or construction activ-
ities clearly affect the environment,14 NEPA's bearing on SEC activ-
ities is still unsettled. In National Resource Defense Council 
(NRDC) v. SECI5 the federal courts will ultimately determine the 
relationship between NEPA and the securities laws. The NRDC 
seeks a conclusive judicial ruling that the public information func-
tions of the Acts overlap, thereby mandating the SEC to require 
comprehensive corporate environmental impact disclosure. IS The 
impact of such a ruling would be substantial. First, NEP A would 
be construed, at least in this instance, as reaching beyond federal 
agency disclosure and into the area of private action. 17 Second, SEC 
, NEPA does establish the Council on Economic Quality (CEQ), which reviews environ-
mental matters and advises the President and administrative agencies. However, the CEQ 
has no regulatory powers to set or enforce standards. 42 U.S.C. § 4341 (1970). 
I. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). 
II [d. § 4332. 
12 [d. § 4331(b)(3). 
13 [d. § 4332(c). 
" See, e.g., Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
1971) . 
.. National Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, Civ. No. 409-73 (D.D.C. 1973); see also 
10 E.R.C. 1001 (D.D.C. 1977) and 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974). 
II For discussion of the disclosure rules suggested by the NRDC, see text at notes 89-92, 
infra. 
17 Disclosure under NEPA has been confined thus far to the agency issued EIS. The EIS 
may report on private activity in cases of joint federal and private projects. However, NRDC 
u. SEC is unique in that it would require environmental disclosure of completely private 
activity. Since government regulation of corporate disclosure involves rule making and en-
forcement, the basis for the suit is the agency's obligation to further environmental goals 
wherever practicable. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). The EIS requirement, which depends on a 
finding of major federal action, has not been asserted. [d. § 4332. 
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jurisdiction would be conclusively extended into corporate social 
policy disclosure.18 
This article will examine the effect of NEPA on the SEC's juris-
diction over corporate disclosure. It will consider the desirability of 
corporate environmental disclosure and evaluate some of the avail-
able disclosure devices. Additionally, the article will analyze the 
degree to which NEPA requires the Commission to demand environ-
mental accountability from registrant companies, attempting to dif-
ferentiate the SEC's discretion to promulgate corporate disclosure 
rules from its obligation under NEPA to further environmental 
goals. 
I. BREADTH OF SEC JURISDICTION 
The Commission derives its authority to require corporate disclo-
sure from its administrative jurisdiction over securities which corpo-
rations issue. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act were origi-
nally intended to curb abuses in the issuing and trading of corporate 
stocks and bonds. IS Full and fair disclosure of salient information 
about the securities and the companies issuing them was considered 
more desirable than a direct grant of governmental authority to pass 
on the investment merits of the securities.20 Thus, the resulting 
statutory provisions are aimed at protecting investors by providing 
them with information useful in investment decisionmaking.21 
A. Mechanics of Corporate Disclosure: The Financial Aspect 
The framework of securities regulation should be understood be-
fore an analysis of environmental accountability under SEC aus-
pices can be considered. This framework is essentially financial. 
Under the Securities Act a corporation within SEC jurisdiction22 
must provide a registration statement before publicly issuing securi-
IK To date, social policy disclosure has been required only on a case-by-case basis. See the 
discussion of anti-fraud rules in text at notes 133-147, infra. The Commission has not promul-
gated specific rules requiring social impact reporting. 
" See President Roosevelt's Message to Congress Proposing Enactment of Securities Dis-
closure Legislation, 77 CONGo REc. 937 (1933). 
20 Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933,28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 
30-34 (1959). 
21 See Schoenbaum, The Relationship Between Corporate Disclosure and Corporate 
Responsibility, 40 FORDHAM L. REv. 565, 566 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Disclosure and 
Responsibility J. 
22 Generally, corporations offering securities for public sale are within SEC jurisdiction. 15 
U.S.C. § 77d (1970). 
158 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:155 
ties. 23 Although the Act concerns the integrity of publicly sold stocks 
and bonds, most of the information which must be provided in the 
registration statement pertains to the issuing corporation rather 
than to the security itself.24 In addition to various technical financial 
information, including a complete financial statement by an inde-
pendent certified public accountant,25 the corporation must include 
in the registration statement "such further material information, if 
any, as may be necessary· to make the required statements, in the 
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not mislead-
ing."28 
Since the securities may not be issued until the registration state-
ment becomes effective, the Commission enforces disclosure re-
quirements by delaying or suspending registration effectiveness.27 
Additionally, the corporate management may be subject to civil or 
criminal liability if the statement contains a material misstatement 
or omission of a material fact as defined by the Commission.28 
After issuance, a security issued by a company having at least $1 
million in total assets and a class of equity securities held of record 
by 500 or more persons29 becomes subject to the disclosure require-
ments of the Exchange Act.30 This Act requires periodic update of 
the disclosure reports. 31 Affected registrant companies must file 
annual reports updating the registration statement32 and quarterly 
23 [d. § 77e. 
" Disclosure and Responsibility, supra note 21, at 567. 
" See Form 8-A, 3 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 30601 (1975). 
2ft Securities Act Rule 408(1),17 C.F.R. § 230.408(1). The Exchange Act contains an identi-
cal provision in its disclosure requirements. Exchange Act Rule lOb-5(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-
5(b). "Material information" is defined by the Commission as "those matters as to which an 
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the security 
registered." Securities Act Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405. Recently the Commission has 
expanded its view of "materiality" to include non-financial information, especially with 
regard to proxy statement disclosure. See the discussion of the proxy rules in text at notes 
117-18, infra. 
%7 See 1 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 265-316 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as Loss]; 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(b), (d) (1970). 
211 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970). 
" 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(i) (1970). Securities listed on the national exchanges are technically 
exempt from this requirement, but the exemption is in name only as the exchanges are 
required to obtain registration from the issuing corporations, the same information is re-
quired, and duplicates are sent to the SEC. [d. § 781(g)(2)(A). 
30 [d. § § 78a et seq. 
3\ [d. § 78m. 
32 Form lO-K, 34 RELEASE 9000 [1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH), 
~ 77919. 
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reports,33 consisting primarily of profit and loss figures. In addition, 
current reports must be filed within ten days of the close of any 
month in which one of several specified events takes place.34 
The Exchange Act also requires that information similar to that 
filed with the SEC must be sent to the company's stockholders 
whenever proxies are solicited.35 Disclosure through the proxy rules 
is potentially the most significant source for public information con-
cerning corporate behavior.36 Distribution of corporate data to all 
the stockholders of a large company is tantamount to public disclo-
sure. Further, the proxy machinery affects shareholder participation 
in decision making in two significant ways. First, it provides a fac-
tual basis on which the shareholder can determine whether to give 
a proxy and how to mark it.37 Second, the proxy machinery publi-
cizes shareholders' proposals.38 SEC proxy rule 14a-8 entitles any 
3:' Form 10-Q, 34 RELEASE 9004 [1970-71 Transfer Binderl FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH), 
~ 77920. 
a. Form 8-K, 3 FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH), ~ 31001. The events which must be immediately 
reported are all financial in nature, e.g., change in control, acquistion or disposition of assets, 
legal proceedings, change in securities, increase or decrease in the amount of securities out-
standing, revaluation of assets, and submission of matters to a shareholder vote. 
" 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1970). The Commission has broad rulemaking authority to prescribe 
disclosure requirements which management must make when it solicits proxies. The proxy 
rules are intended to further the exercise of corporate democracy, one of the major objectives 
of the Exchange Act. See H.R. REp. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934): "Fair corporate 
sufferage is an important right that should attach to every equity security bought on a public 
exchange. Management of properties owned by the investing public should not be permitted 
to perpetuate themselves by the misuse of corporate proxies." [d. 
Even if proxies are not solicited the Act provides that substantially equivalent information 
must be sent. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (1970). If the proxy solicitation is on behalf of management 
regarding an annual meeting at which directors are to be elected, the proxy statement must 
usually be either accompanied or preceded by an annual report. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1976). 
For the most part, content of the annual report to the shareholders may be determined by 
the management. It is not filed with the SEC and usually includes a great deal of public 
relations information about the company. Disclosure and Responsibility, supra note 21, at 
589. 
" Professor Loss has written on the importance of the proxy rules: 
The proxy rules are very likely the most effective disclosure device in the SEC scheme of 
things. The proxy literature, unlike the application for registration gets into the hands of 
investors. Unlike the Securities Act prospectus it gets there in time. It is more readable 
than any of those other documents. And it gets to a great many people who never see a 
prospectus. (emphasis in original.) 
2 Loss, supra note 27, at 1027. 
37 The proxy materials, which notify each shareholder of record as to the matters to be 
acted on at the shareholder's meeting, also advise the shareholder of shareholder rights and 
make certain disclosures about the proposals under consideration, including information 
about the directors or director nominees. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1976). 
a. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1976). 
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voting stockholder to present a proposal for action at the share-
holder meeting. The stockholder may require management to in-
clude the proposal in its proxy statement.39 
Until 1970, the shareholder proposal rule was severely restricted. 
The proxy rules permitted management to exclude a shareholder 
proposal from the proxy statement if the proposal was deemed not 
a proper subject for action by the shareholders,40 was related to 
ordinary business operations of the corporation, H or was submitted 
primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, 
racial, religious, or social causes.42 The Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia decision in Medical Committee for Human 
Rights v. SEC43 narrowed the application of this rule considerably. 
The decision overruled a Commission determination that the man-
agement of Dow Chemical could properly exclude from the proxy 
statement a shareholder proposal urging a resolution to prohibit the 
company from manufacturing napalm. In holding that the resolu-
tion was both a proper subject for shareholder action and that it was 
not subject to political exclusion, the court found that Dow was 
financially harmed by public ill-will created by napalm manufac-
turing. Hence the activity was within the shareholder sphere of 
concern.44 However, the court strongly suggested that, even if the 
shareholder proposal had not involved financial advantage, share-
holders have an interest in the social consequences of their com-
"' SEC RELEASE No. 34-12999 (Nov. 26, 1976), SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 380 at E-8. 
The shareholder is also permitted to include a 200 word supporting statement . 
.. "Improper subject for shareholder action," identifying a matter reserved for the discre-
tion of the Board of Directors, is still a reason for excluding a shareholder proposal from the 
proxy statement. Proper subjects are determined according to the law of the issuer's domicile. 
2 Loss, supra note 27, at 902. See also Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33, 43 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. 
denied, 361 U.S. 835 (1959). 
" 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1976). The Commission concedes that this limitation has 
permitted proposals of considerable importance to security holders to be excluded. Neverthe-
less, the Commission has retained the limitation in order to avoid shareholder consideration 
of complex business matters on which "shareholders, as a group, would not be qualified to 
make an informed judgment." SEC RELEASE No. 34-12999 (Nov. 26, 1976), SEC. REG. & L. 
REp. (BNA) No. 380 at E-5. However, in lieu of liberalization of the rule, the Commission 
announced a flexible interpretation of the rule. Under the newest interpretation, "ordinary 
business operations" will not exclude matters significantly related to policy or economic 
considerations, such as a proposal that a utility company not construct a nuclear power plant. 
[d. 
" 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(2)(ii). See note 46, infra, and accompanying text; SEC RELEASE 
No. 34-12999 (Nov. 26, 1976), SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 380 at E-5. 
13 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). 
" [d. at 681. 
1977] CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 161 
pany's activity.45 
In the wake of the Medical Committee decision the SEC qualified 
the social cause exclusion so that a shareholder proposal relating to 
social policy decision making is now excludable from the proxy state-
ment only if it is "not significantly related to the business of the 
issuer."46 The Commission has specifically declined to incorporate 
a test of economic significance for determining degree of relation to 
the company's business. Further, the Commission has stated that 
matters "relating to ethical issues such as political contributions" 
may fall within the "significantly related to business" standardY 
B. Disclosure's Broader Role: The Social Aspect 
Increasing shareholder influence on corporate decisionmaking 
through the proxy mechanism, especially for non-economic policies, 
reflects growing acceptance of the doctrine that many corporations 
are quasi-public entities. 48 The theory is rooted in the enormous 
concentration of economic power in the corporate sector. The bur-
geoning number of shareholders who participate in the market 
through investment funds and institutions further supports the the-
sis.49 The doctrine that corporations are quasi-public institutions 
strongly suggests that the public should have power to scrutinize 
corporate activity. 50 
The arguments favoring broader corporate disclosure under SEC 
rules require extending the theoretical basis of disclosure. 51 A share-
holder's interest in security investment must be viewed as more 
than an interest in deriving profit, and disclosure must be viewed 
as an inducement to responsible corporate behavior. Traditionally, 
inducement to socially responsible decisionmaking has been viewed 
as a secondary benefit of disclosure rather than a primary goal52 and 
.. For analysis of the socially motivated proposal exclusion under Medical Committee, see 
Chisulm, Napalm, Proxy Proposals and the SEC, 12 ARIZ. L. REv. 463 (1970). 
II SEC RELEASE No. 34-12999 (Nov. 26, 1976), SEC. REo. & L. REp. (BNA) No. 380 at E-8. 
" [d. at E-4 . 
.. Drucker, Big Business and the National Purpose, 40 HARV. Bus. REv. 48, 59 (1962). This 
is not a new idea. Felix Frankfurter, one of the drafters of the 1933 Act, wrote in that year 
that the Securities Act "proceeds on the principle that when a corporation seeks funds from 
the public it becomes in every true sense a public corporation." Frankfurter, The Securities 
Act: Social Consequences, FORTUNE, Aug., 1933, at 55. 
" Drucker, supra note 48, at 59. 
50 See Disclosure and Responsibility, supra note 21, at 587. 
" See text at notes 19-21, supra. 
52 Some writers continue to reject vigorously the notion that corporations have any function 
other than to make as much money for the shareholders as possible. See Corporate Responsi-
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the foremost justification for disclosure has been protection of inves-
tors' pecuniary interests.53 Nevertheless, disclosure's effect on corpo-
rate conduct, at least in an economic, if not social, sense was cer-
tainly a major expectation of the 1933 and 1934 enactments.a4 Re-
cently the financial and legal communities have recognized disclo-
sure's tendency to induce socially responsible corporate decisions as 
a legitimate independent function. 55 
The language of the Securities Act supplies adequate authority 
for SEC regulation of social policy disclosure. The Act provides that 
the Commission may require disclosure of such "other information" 
as the Commission determines is "necessary or appropriate in the 
public interest or for the protection of investors. "56 One fair reading 
of this section implies that Congress did not intend to limit the 
application of the securities laws to investors and the investment 
community. This section also implies that the jurisdiction of the 
Commission is broad enough to reflect changing economic and so-
cial climates. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit has recognized that social policy affects corporate profits57 
which in turn affects the value of corporate securities. This relation-
ship suggests that social policy disclosure is well within the Com-
mission's jurisdiction. 
However, the SEC's own view of its role in this area limits further 
development of disclosure as an instrument of corporate responsibil-
bility Panel: The Role of the SEC, 28 Bus. LAw. 215, 223 (March 1973) (1973 special issue). 
However, many commentators advocate mandatory disclosure in areas such as minority 
hiring practices, product safety, foreign and domestic political contributions, and environ· 
mental impact. See e.g. Cary, Corporate Standards and Legal Rules, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 408, 
417·18 (1962); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REv. 607, 647 
(1964). During the comment period on environmental impact rules, the SEC received sugges· 
tions for over 100 areas of social disclosure. SEC. REo. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 324 at E·l 
[hereinafter cited as COMMISSION RELEASE]. The only areas which are being litigated in 
NRDC u. SEC are environmental impact disclosure and minority hiring practices disclosure. 
The claim for environmental disclosure is based on NEPA. See text at notes 75·81, infra. The 
minority hiring practices claim is based on a more general duty to implement national policy 
objectives. 
50 See text at notes 19·21, supra. 
54 Frankfurter, supra note 48. 
50 See Disclosure to Investors-A Reappraisal of the Administrative Policies Under the '33 
and '34 Acts (1969) [hereinafter cited as The Wheat Report] . 
.. 15 U.S.C. § 77(g) (1970) (emphasis added). 
" See Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659,681 (1970). Products 
liability lawsuits, governmental and private damage actions for environmental degradation, 
and public boycotts of a company's products are examples of financial ramifications which 
may result from irresponsible corporate activities. 
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ity.5R The SEC has rejected numerous suggestions that it expand 
disclosure of information on socially significant corporate activi-
ties. 59 This is possible because the Commission's power to require 
corporate social disclosure is apparently discretionary.6o The issue 
in NRDC v. SEC is whether NEPA overrides that discretion regard-
ing environmental impact, creating a judicially enforceable obliga-
tion to promulgate substantive environmental disclosure regula-
tions. 
II. NEPA: PROCEDURE v. SUBSTANCE 
The National Environmental Policy Act became effective on Jan-
uary 1, 1970.61 The general policy statement which establishes envi-
ronmental protection as a national priority is contained in section 
101 of the Act. 62 This may be regarded as the substantive section.63 
Section 102 of NEPA, the "action forcing" section,64 requires that a 
detailed EIS must accompany every "major Federal action signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment."65 
In 1971, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
in Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC)66 established NEPA as a full disclosure act. In 
holding that the AEC's rules precluding agency consideration of 
environmental issues violated NEPA, the court articulated the stan-
dard for compliance with the Act-a case-by-case analysis of every 
major federal agency action weighing environmental impact against 
the countervailing benefits of the proposed activityY 
Calvert Cliff's specifically rejected the AEC's argument that com-
" See generally SEC RELEASE No. 33-5704, (May 6, 1976), SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) No. 
352, explaining why environmental disclosure is beyond the purview of securities regulation. 
" See, e.g., Disclosure and Responsibility, supra note 21; Sonde & Pitt, Utilizing the 
Federal Securities Laws to "Clear the Air! Clean the Sky! Wash the Wind!", 16 HOWARD L.J. 
831 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Clear the Air!]. The SEC has appointed an Advisory Com-
mittee on Corporate Disclosure to undertake a comprehensive study of the current system of 
disclosure, its goals and effectiveness, and to recommend changes in the objectives and 
application of the disclosure rules where appropriate. This is the first study of such breadth 
since The Wheat Report, supra note 55. 
,. See text at note 56, supra. 
" Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 853 (1970). 
" 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970). 
" Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (1971). 
" Deutsch, The National Environmental Policy Act's First Five Years, 4 ENv. AFF. 3, 6 (1975). 
ft5 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970). 
" 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
" [d. at 1123. 
164 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:155 
pliance with the EIS requirement was a matter of administrative 
discretion. 68 The opinion stressed acorn parison between the qualify-
ing language of NEPA's substantive policy section (§ 101) and the 
language of the action forcing procedural section (§ 102).69 The lan-
guage of the policy section mandates the protection of the environ-
ment by all "practicable means and measures,"70 while the proce-
dural section states that the duties prescribed therein shall be exe-
cuted "to the fullest extent possible. "71 The court concluded that 
the difference in language between the two sections illustrated con-
gressional intent that the procedural duties established by section 
102 (preparation and consideration of the EIS) were less flexible 
than the section 101 substantive duties (choosing environmentally 
beneficial al terna ti ves) .72 
In addition to establishing the harm-benefit balancing standard 
for NEPA's EIS requirement, Calvert Cliff's established the court's 
jurisdiction to review administrative action under NEPA.73 Again 
the opinion distinguished the procedural and substantive aspects of 
NEPA, holding procedural review to be more rigorous and expan-
sive. The court said: 
Section 102 of NEPA mandates a particular sort of careful and informed 
decisionmaking process and creates judicially enforceable duties. The 
reviewing court probably cannot reverse a substantive decision on its 
merits, under Section 101, unless it be shown that the actual balance of 
costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave insuffi-
cient weight to environmental values. But if the decision was reached 
procedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of en-
vironmental factors-conducted fully and in good faith-it is the re-
sponsibility of the courts to reverse.74 
Like section 102, NEPA's section 103 provided procedure for 
agency execution of the substantive policies of the Act. Section 103 
required all federal agencies to review their policies, regulations and 
procedures and "propose to the President by July 1, 1971 such mea-
sures as may be necessary to bring their authority and policies into 
conformity with the Act."75 This section was further supplemented 
" [d. at 1114 . 
.. [d. at 1113-14. 
,. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970) (emphasis added). 
71 [d. § 4332 (emphasis added). 
72 449 F.2d at 1115. 
J3 [d. 
" [d. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (1970). 
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by an Executive Order of March, 1970, requiring agencies to 
"initiate measures needed to direct their policies, plans and pro-
grams so as to meet national environmental goals," and directed 
agencies "to develop programs and measures to protect and enhance 
the environmental quality."76 
In June, 1971, over a year after the Executive Order was issued 
and only one month before the response deadline, the SEC had still 
not begun to formally consider its NEPA responsibilities. 77 At that 
time the NRDC asserted that NEPA and the supplementary Execu-
tive Order required the SEC to revise its securities registration 
forms.7s The proposed revisions would add disclosure rules concern-
ing corporate environmental impact. 79 Thus, asserts NRDC, the 
SEC would bring its "authority and policies into conformity" with 
NEPA, as required by section 103 of the Act. sO 
Judicial support for the NRDC's position may very well depend 
upon the federal courts' willingness to go beyond the Calvert Cliff's 
requirement to fully "consider" environmental goals, for the NRDC 
is asking the court to override the SEC's determinations following 
an extensive procedural analysis. In seeking judicially compelled 
corporate environmental disclosure regulations, the NRDC is ulti-
mately asking for a substantive response to NEPA. 
TIL NRDC v. SEC: CAN THE COURTS COMPEL CORPORATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCLOSURE? 
A. Background 
Initially, the NRDC pursued corporate environmental disclosure 
by filing a rule making petition requesting the SEC to promulgate 
76 Exec. Order No. 11514,35 Fed. Reg. 4247 (1970). 
77 See NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 684, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Commission probably 
assumed that, as a non-licensing agency, it had no responsibility under the Act. The Commis-
sion has since stated that its existing general rule requiring disclosure of "any other material 
information" complied with NEPA insofar as environmental compliance laws and legal pro-
ceedings affecting a registrant's business would be deemed material. SEC RELEASE No. 33-
5170 (July 19, 1971) [1970-71 Transfer Binder]. See note 28, supra. 
1M The NRDC was acting in its capacity as a public interest association, whose members 
are potential stock market investors. National Resource Defense Council v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 
689, 697 (D.D.C. 1973). NRDC asserts standing on the basis that some members are inter-
ested in investing their funds in environmentally responsible corporations. The district court 
upheld NRDC's standing on the ground that lack of the desired information provided the 
requisite "injury in fact." [d.; United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
" See text at notes 89-92, infra. 
'" 42 U.S.C. § 4333 (1970). 
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special rules in response to NEP A. 81 When the petition was denied, 
the NRDC filed for review in the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia.82 The court of appeals dismissed the suit 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction83 and, in March, 1972, the 
NRDC initiated the current action, NRDC v. SEC,84 in the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
Shortly before the litigation commenced, the Commission an-
nounced that it was considering proposed amendments to some of 
its forms.8a The amendments, formally adopted on April 30, 1973,88 
require corporations to disclose the effect of the corporation's envi-
ronmental impact on an issuer's business. The amendments concern 
only the economic ramifications of environmental impact, not the 
impact itself. Further, disclosure is required only insofar as environ-
mental impact relates to compliance with governmental stan-
dards. 87 Even before NEPA this type of information was probably 
required to be disclosed under the "materiality" catchall provision 
of the Securities Act.88 
The NRDC proposals, on the other hand, require specified regis-
trants89 to disclose their current environmental impact, quantified 
" As provided by the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970), any 
interested person may file a petition requesting rule consideration. The petition also included 
a request that the SEC promulgate certain disclosure rules regarding registrants' minority 
hiring practices. See note 56, supra. 
K2 NRDC v. SEC, Civ. No. 72-1148 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
'" Direct review by the court of appeals is available only where the agency action is "final." 
5 U.S.C. § 704 (1970). The SEC's action was deemed not final because it had not yet promul-
gated its official response to NEPA. See SEC RELEASE No. 33-5170 (July 19, 1971) [1970-71 
Transfer Binder], FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) ~78150. 
" Civ. No. 409-73 (D.D.C. 1973). The action has already been heard twice in the district 
court. The first time it was remanded on procedural grounds. 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974). 
See text at notes 94-101, infra. After the SEC complied with its duty to conduct full hearings 
in light of NEPA, the district court found the Commission's response to these hearings 
arbitrary and capricious and remanded again. 10 E.R.C. 1001 (D.D.C. 1977). See text at notes 
138-40, infra. 
" SEC. RELEASE No. 33-5325 (Feb. 16, 1972) [1971-72 Transfer Binder), FED. SEC. L. REp. 
(CCH) ~78524. 
" SEC RELEASE No. 33-5386 (Apr. 20, 1973), SEC. REG. & L. REp. (BNA) No. 199. 
" These regulations, which are now in effect, require disclosure of the effect on business 
of: (1) compliance with government standards; (2) administrative or judicial proceedings 
arising under government standards; and (3) major private litigation arising under govern-
ment standards. Form S-l and Form 10, 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.11, 249.310 (1976). 
" See note 26 and accompanying text, supra. 
" The NRDC proposes mandatory environmental impact disclosure by the 15 largest firms 
in 12 industrial categories. [1976) 7 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 575. Presumably this limitation is 
aimed at meeting an SEC argument that environmental data for all registrants would be 
unmanageable. 
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to the extent possible. 90 The proposed rules also require the regis-
trant to disclose the feasibility of curbing the pollution the regis-
trant causes, and any pending or imminent environmental litiga-
tion, and to report any plans it has for improving the registrant's 
environmental impact. Further, the NRDC proposals require corpo-
rations to file with the SEC copies of non-compliance reports under 
governmental standards. The information disclosed under these 
proposed rules would remain with the SEC and would be available 
for public inspection. It would not, however, be generally distrib-
uted to shareholders in the proxy statement.9! 
Unlike the rules promulgated by the Commission, the NRDC 
proposals require all affected companies to account for their envi-
ronmental impact. The proposals do not make environmental dis-
closure contingent on corresponding impact on the registrant's fin-
ancial condition. Rather they emphasize that a company's environ-
mental impact may be important to shareholders whether or not the 
impact has secondary economic effects. 
The SEC acknowledges its jurisdiction to promulgate rules such 
as those proposed by the NRDC.92 Its general mandate to require 
disclosure of such "other information" as it determines is appropri-
ate in the public interest authorizes broad SEC rulemaking discre-
tion. 93 However, the Commission views the NRDC's proposals as an 
undesirable administrative burden and not of general investor inter-
est. 94 
.. , The disclosure requirement would apply whether or not the company's impact violated 
government standards. Id. 
YI Id. 
" See COMMISSION RELEASE, supra note 52 at E-7. The Commission's rejection of the NRDC 
proposals does not include jurisdictional rationale. 
U3 See Flint Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Scenic Rivers Assoc., 426 U.S. 776 (1976). In Flint Ridge, 
the Supreme Court reviewed a 10th Circuit decision holding that registration of a land 
developer's disclosure statement (which the Supreme Court likened to securities registration, 
426 U.S. at 778) by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) constituted 
major federal action within section 102 of NEPA and hence required HUD to prepare an EIS. 
The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court, but rested its decision on the ground that 
preparation of an EIS was impossible within the 30 day time standard set by the Interstate 
Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1704, 1706(a) (1970). The Court refused to rule 
that registration of disclosure information by a federal agency was beyond NEPA's mandate 
to prepare an EIS. 426 U.S. at 787. Further, the Court specifically stated that HUD could 
adopt a wide range of rules requiring developers to furnish environmental impact information 
in their prospectus if the Secretary determined that such disclosure would protect investors 
or be in the public interest. 426 U.S. at 792. 
" See COMMISSION RELEASE, supra note 52, nn. 35, 44. 
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B. The 1974 Remand 
On December 9, 1974, the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia issued its first opinion in NRDC v. SEC and 
remanded the case to the SEC for further consideration of rules 
responding to the NEPA mandate. However, the court left the chal-
lenged regulations in effect pending the Commission's response 
after remand hearings.9s The district court relied on a strict con-
struction of the Administrative Procedure Act (AP A), 98 not on the 
substance of the NEPA mandate. The court concluded that the 
Commission had violated the APA in two respects. First, the Com-
mission had not adequately notified the public that the proposed 
rules were intended to satisfy the SEC's obligation under NEPA.97 
Second, the Commission had not explained the rationale and pur-
pose of the rules in sufficient detail to permit judicial review of the 
consideration process.98 The remand directed the Commission to 
"develop a record" which would be useful in resolving two key fac-
tual issues: the SEC was to determine the extent of "ethical inves-
tor" interest in environmental disclosure, and to consider which 
disclosure methods would best provide the interested investors with 
the necessary information and eliminate "corporate practices that 
are inimical to the environment."DD 
The grounds for the 1974 remand were a procedural rather than 
substantive rejection of the Commission's response to NEPA. How-
ever, the opinion indicates the court's sympathy with the NRDC's 
position. For example, the court directed that the SEC not limit its 
factual inquiry to the areas directed in the order, but "[r]ather, it 
must imaginatively exercise its authority and expertise."loo Com-
menting on the substance of the NRDC's petition, the court noted 
that there "appears to be merit in Plaintiffs' disclosure suggestions 
which the Commission should carefully consider along with other 
proposals by interested parties. "101 
The court's obvious preference for greater environmental disclo-
sure was not, however, a victory for environmentalists. The district 
.. NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974) . 
.. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970). 
" 389 F. Supp. 689, 699. 
UK [d. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA, 462 F.2d 846,850 (D.C. 
Cir.1972) . 
.. 389 F. Supp. 689, 701. 
"" [d. at 702. 
1111 [d. 
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court decision caused a two year delay while the Commission held 
lengthy hearings on the merits of various plans for environmental 
disclosure.102 During the review period no new rules regarding envi-
ronmental disclosure were put into effect. The Commission ulti-
mately reaffirmed its original position that environmental disclo-
sure rules are not desirable except insofar as the disclosure pertains 
to the company's financial position. 103 The NRDC therefore renewed 
its challenge to the promulgated rules. 
Given the court's obvious sympathy for the environmentalist's 
position, the court would likely have decided in favor of the NRDC 
in 1974 on substantive grounds if possible. The procedural remand 
thus reflects upon the merits of the NRDC's substantive claims. l04 
The SEC has complied with the court's procedural orders.l05 Now, 
the issue is the validity of the conclusions which the Commission 
reached after performing the required cost-benefit analysis. 
C. The Findings on Remand 
1) Investor Interest: 
In 1974, the court remanded environmental disclosure authority 
to the SEC with two directives. The Commission was ordered to 
determine, first, the extent of investor interest, and, second, the 
best method for achieving environmental disclosure}08 In response 
to the first directive the SEC concluded that the investor interest 
was difficult to quantify. 107 
Approximately 100 participants who identified themselves as 
investors expressed interest in social policy disclosure. lOS Due to the 
cost of participation this number is probably but a small fraction 
of those investors with some degree of interest. IOU The Commission 
102 Public hearings held in April and May of 1975 included 54 oral presentations and 353 
written comments. The Commission's evaluations of the proceedings are reported in 
COMMISSION RELEASE, supra note 52. 
1~1 See text at notes 85-88, supra. 
"" In its most recent decision in NRDC u. SEC, the district court found that NEPA does 
not substantively require the SEC to promulgate environmental disclosure rules. NRDC v. 
SEC, 10 E.R.C. 1030 (D.D.C. 1977). 
I.' Id. at E-8 as modified in SEC RELEASE No. 33-5704 (May 6, 1976), SEC. REG. & L. REp. 
(BNA) No. 352. See note 87, supra. 
1116 See text at notes 98-99. 
1117 See COMMISSION RELEASE, supra note 52, at E.-9. 
"" Id. 
II~ See generally Comment, Federal Agency Compensation of Intervenors, 5 ENV. Arr. 697 
(1976). 
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characterized investor interest as "an insignificant percentage" of 
American shareholders. 110 The SEC noted that many of the partici-
pating "ethical investors" did not identify their investment portfo-
lios. However, the SEC estimated the holdings of "those who did as 
2/3 of 1 % of the estimated aggregate value of the stocks and bonds 
held in the United States as of the end of 1974."111 This estimate, 
however, means little, absent data relating the ratio of participants 
in the SEC proceedings to the actual number of interested investors. 
Further confusing the quantification of investor interest, the SEC 
reported that the interested participants included "approximately 
seven foundations, 22 religious institutions, 11 educational institu-
tions, two mutual funds, five environmental groups, 37 individuals, 
and one state, Minnesota .... "112 Since these participants repre-
sent many individuals, the number of interested investors is proba-
bly many times the number of participants. 
Although not specifically requested to do so, the Commission re-
ported finding three recurring rationales for the participants' inter-
est in environmental disclosure. Each rationale related to economic 
rather than social concerns. 1I3 The SEC's report on these findings 
does not attempt to relate the rationales for investor interest to the 
rules promulgated. 1I4 Analysis suggests that these rules do not pro-
vide disclosure adequate to satisfy investor interest in environmen-
tal disclosure. 
First, the SEC found that investors feel that non-compliance with 
environmental laws could lead to extensive corporate costs or liabili-
ties. 115 The current rules requiring disclosure of pending or imminent 
litigation do not answer this concern. 1I6 The rules provide no infor-
mation to allow prediction of conflicts not yet matured to the point 
of imminent litigation. Disclosure of non-compliance with existing 
1111 COMMISSION RELEASE, supra note 52, at E-9. 
III [d. at E-9-10 (footnotes omitted). 
112 [d. at E-9-10 n.49. 
"" [d. at E-ll. 
III See generally COMMISSION RELEASE, supra note 52. 
115 See note 87, supra. 
"' For suggested comprehensive environmental disclosure rules see Clear the Air', supra 
note 59, in which the Assistant General Counsel and the Special Counsel of the SEC called 
for comprehensive environmental disclosure rules and made specific proposals for amend-
ments to the registration statement, id. at 883, and proxy rules, id. at 896. In addition to 
reporting non-compliance with environmental standards, the authors would obligate the 
registrant corporation to assess any detrimental effect of its activities or extended use of the 
products it manufactures. [d. at 887. 
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environmental standards might be a practical solution to this infor-
mation gap. 
The SEC determined that the investors' second rationale for in-
terest in environmental disclosure was that the ability to avoid envi-
ronmental litigation provides an index to management's overall 
effectiveness.lI7 The absence of litigation might arguably indicate an 
absence of problems, and one might therefore infer that the inter-
ested investor could depend on the litigation disclosure rules to 
provide the desired information. However, the absence of litigation 
may be less related to the quality of management than to the fact 
that not every environmental violation results in litigation. Further, 
if the quality of management is measured by the ability to avoid 
lawsuits, it should also be assessed for responsible decisionmaking. 
Hence, this reason for investor interest in environmental informa-
tion favors regulations holding corporations accountable for the 
impact of their activities regardless of whether the activities lead to 
litigation. 
The third SEC rationale for investor interest in environmental 
disclosure was that corporate social responsibility fosters the regula-
tory approval and positive public relations necessary for long-run 
corporate profitability. liS The Commission apparently considers this 
investor concern as an important factor in its conclusion that envi-
ronmental disclosure is useful only as it pertains to the economic 
performance of the registrant. liD Yet the Commission has not ex-
plained how existing regulations provide information useful in de-
termining whether a company is socially responsible. The Commis-
sion may be correct in finding that environmental responsibility is 
only significant to investors because it pertains to corporate profita-
bility. However, if investor interest is valid, for any reason whatever, 
then disclosure regulations which would aid the investor in evaluat-
ing corporate environmental responsibility are in order. 
2) Implementing Environmental Disclosure: 
The district court's second directive ordered the Commission to 
determine how to utilize disclosure for the benefit of shareholders 
and the environment. 12o In response, the SEC found the benefits of 
tI7 COMMISSION RELEASE, supra note 52, at E-l1. 
'" [d. 
'" [d. 
"" See text at note 99, supra. 
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comprehensive environmental disclosure rules to be outweighed by 
the administrative costs and burdens such rules would impose. 121 
The SEC based its findings on evidence that disclosure through 
securities registration would duplicate other disclosure sources. This 
was supported by participants' testimony that "existing environ-
mental statutes already provide a sufficient incentive to avoid envi-
ronmental injury ... , companies are already required to monitor 
many aspects of their environmental practices and to file public 
compliance reports with various state and federal agencies, and ... 
instances of significant environmental degradation are already 
widely publicized."122 However, the Commission's summary of its 
findings noted that shareholders do not presently have ready access 
to the information provided through these sources. 123 
The SEC also found that disclosure rules such as those suggested 
by the NRDC would be subjective because of lack of agreement 
within the scientific community as to the effect of many activities 
on the environment. 124 Finally, the Commission found that the 
amount of detail necessary for meaningful environmental data 
might render disclosure documents as a whole more confusing to 
investors.125 Thus, the Commission maintains that the only environ-
mental information which could be uniformly and economically re-
ported, other than the litigation and materiality requirements, is 
the corporation's estimate of "material estimated capital expendi-
tures for environmental control facilities. "126 This means, that for 
companies not planning any such expenditures, NEPA has virtually 
no effect on disclosure responsibilities. 
The most important finding resulting from the hearings is that 
the majority of participating interested investors would use the in-
formation to vote their proxies or to make shareholder proposals. 127 
In light of this and the court's second directive, that the Commis-
sion determine the most appropriate response to NEPA,128 it is dis-
'21 See text at notes 124-26, infra. 
122 COMMISSION RELEASE, supra note 52, at E-11. 
12:\ [d. 
'24 [d. at E-8. 
'25 [d. But see, Clear the Air!, supra note 59; see also Marlin, Accounting for Pollution, 135 
J. ACCOUNTANCY 41 (1973) (suggested model for reporting environmental impact in financial 
statements). The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has appointed Commit-
tees on Environmental Accounting and Social Measurement but they have not established 
reporting standards for a company's environmental and social performance. [d. at 43 n.7. 
,2ft COMMISSION RELEASE, supra note 52, at E-5. 
127 [d. at E-11. 
'" See text at note 99, supra. 
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appointing that the SEC has determined not to amend the proxy 
rules. 129 The principle behind the proxy rules is corporate democ-
racy, the right of shareholders to express their views on the conduct 
of their corporation and to select the individuals who make its day-
to-day decisions. 131I 
Further, disclosure through the proxy rules amounts to public 
disclosure in cases of large public corporations. If publicity induces 
socially desirable behavior,13I then wider distribution ofthe informa-
tion will result in greater behavioral benefits. Initially, the Commis-
sion's proposed amendments did include one proxy regulation-a 
requirement that corporations disclose in their proxy statements the 
existence of environmental non-compliance reports. 132 Even this 
limited proposal was abandoned before promulgation. 133 
Under current regulations, the only proxy rule which could be 
construed as requiring any environmental impact disclosure is the 
general anti-fraud provision. This rule requires inclusion of any 
"material information" necessary in order to make the solicitation 
statements not misleading. 134 The Commission has used this rule in 
the past as a basis for enforcing failure-to-disclose liabilities where 
socially questionable activities were financially detrimental to 
stockholders.130 The SEC may contend that its vigorous past use of 
the anti-fraud rule foretells similar enforcement in the environmen-
tal area. However, the provision has three major deficiencies pre-
'" Moreover, the NRDC has also overlooked the importance of this factor. See text at notes 
90-91, supra. 
1311 See text at notes 35-39, supra. 
'31 See text at notes 52-55, supra. 
132 COMMISSION RELEASE, supra note 52, at E-14. 
,:1:1 SEC RELEASE No. 33-5704 (May 6, 1976), SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 352, at E-l. 
'" Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1976). See discussion of materiality, note 26, supra. 
Rule 10b-5(2) makes any misstatement or omission of a material fact an act of fraud and 
subjects the corporation and the officers involved to civil liability for losses incurred by 
shareholders who either buy or sell securities without the benefit of disclosure of the informa-
tion. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). There is 
also potential private enforcement of anti-fraud provisions through civil action. J.1. Case Co. 
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 
1:15 The Commission has recently invoked Rule 14a-9 as a basis for suit against corporations 
which fail to disclose any pattern of illegal or immoral conduct that has either been author-
ized or permitted to continue by the directors. The Commission deems such information 
material to a shareholder who must decide whether to exercise management's form of proxy. 
Although no specific rule has been promulgated obligating companies to disclose unlawful 
political contributions or bribes, the Commission has made these activities a target of enforce-
ment under the anti-fraud rule. See e.g., SEC v. United Brands Co., Civ. No. 75-0509 (D.D.C. 
1975) [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), ~95420; SEC v. Kalvex, Civ. No. 
74-5643 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) ~95226. 
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cluding its effective use for environmental accountability. 
First, use of the anti-fraud provision as the sole requirement for 
environmental accountability gives the corporation itself responsi-
bility for determining what information it must disclose. This leaves 
the corporation vulnerable to liability for failure-to-disclose without 
the benefit of specific disclosure guidelines. 138 The absence of guide-
lines also means that the interested stockholder has no means of 
evaluating the completeness of the information which does appear 
in the statement. Shareholders cannot determine what facts have 
been excluded because the company deemed them not "material." 
From the viewpoint of both corporations and shareholders, the anti-
fraud provision would thus not seem to be a satisfactory environ-
mental disclosure device. 
The second problem with the anti-fraud obligation to disclose all 
"material information" results from a flaw in the rule's basic hy-
pothesis. Theoretically, the extra liability imposed by the rule pro-
vides incentive for corporations to disclose all activities which might 
affect financial position. In actual operation, however, the com-
pany's fear that disclosure itself may generate poor public relations 
or environmental litigation acts as a strong disincentive for report-
ing negative environmental effects. This discourages disclosure 
until the disadvantages are outweighed by the risk of liability. The 
precondition to liability, financial effect, is only likely to occur as a 
result of publicity. The rule, therefore, does not become a factor in 
disclosure decision making until exposure from another source is at 
least foreseeable. At best, the rule is an inefficient mechanism for 
informing shareholders of corporate environmental impact. At 
worst, the added liability it imposes may even encourage companies 
to conceal environmental impact. 
Finally, the general anti-fraud obligation has one single advan-
tage, its inherent flexibility. It allows the Commission to review, 
case-by-case, corporate activities which do not lend themselves to 
efficient categorization. However, environmental impact is not such 
an untypical activity. Rather, corporate impact on the environment 
(unlike foreign political contributions, for instance) appurtains to 
nearly all registrants. Certainly it relates to all industrial corpora-
tions. Specific environmental proxy rules would be easier to admin-
ister and would be more broadly enforceable than case-by-case re-
,:141 See generally Mann, Watergate to Bananagate: What Lies Beyond? 31 Bus. LAW. 1663 
(1976). 
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view under the anti-fraud rule. 
The proxy rules are potentially the most effective device for im-
plementing environmental disclosure. Proxy disclosure provides the 
shareholder with direct access to corporate information. Moreover, 
broad distribution of information through proxies ensures true pub-
lic exposure of corporate activities. As now promulgated, the SEC's 
rules rely on the anti-fraud provision for environmental proxy dis-
closure. In light of the SEC's own finding that investors were inter-
ested in environmental data as a potential influence on proxy vot-
ing, the anti-fraud provision is clearly inadequate. The SEC's re-
fusal to promulgate environmental proxy rules, and the NRDC's 
failure to suggest proxy disclosure to the court, indicate that neither 
party perceives the full utility of the proxy device. 
D. The Court's Review of the SEC's Findings: Another Remand 
The SEC's extensive rulemaking hearings may satisfy the court's 
procedural directive. However, the district court specifically in-
structed the SEC to determine how to best serve investors and the 
environment. 137 The Commission found investor interest but failed 
to promulgate rules in light of that interest. Dissatisfied with this 
result, yet unable to find a substantive mandate in NEP A requiring 
the SEC to promulgate environmental disclosure rules,138 the dis-
trict court, in 1977, again resorted to procedural devices to remand 
to the SEC, this time for a feasibility cost study .139 Thus, the district 
court also retains jurisdiction over the case. 
In its 1974 opinion the district court announced that it was pre-
pared to set aside the rules if "the Court finds that the SEC rule-
making is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion' or otherwise 
not in accordance with the law."14o In its 1977 review of the agency's 
rulemaking process the district court ruled that the SEC was 
"arbitrary and capricious" in failing to consider all possible disclo-
sure alternatives, notably the proxy rules, before ruling on the non-
feasibility of environmental disclosure.141 This is especially true in 
light of investor interest in utilizing environmental information for 
making proxy voting decisions. 
137 NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. at 701 (D.D.C. 1974). 
'''' NRDC v. SEC, 10 E.R.C. at 3030 (1977). 
"" [d. at 1042. 
II. NRDC v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. at 698 (D.D.C. 1974). 
'" NRDC v. SEC, 10 E.R.C. at 1041 (D.D.C. 1977). 
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Under the standards suggested by Calvert Cliff's, the agency has 
an unqualified duty to consider environmental factors before act-
ing.142 Its duty to choose the environmentally preferable alternative 
depends upon the "practicability" of doing SO.143 The courts can 
reverse substantive agency decisions under NEPA's requirement to 
choose the environmentally preferable alternative consistent with 
other national priorities}U But Calvert Cliff's remains the touch-
stone of enforcement. It demands objective weighing of these priori-
ties. If the SEC reached its decision in good faith, then it must on 
remand develop a record sufficient to justify its decision to the 
court}45 
The district court's most recent remand rested on deficient ex-
planation of the agency's decisions, not on NEPA's substantive re-
quirements. 14K This reflects the established judicial preference for 
procedural enforcement of NEPA.147 Another procedural delay is 
not, however, a victory for the environment or for interested share-
holders. Hopefully the court will soon review on the merits. In doing 
so the court will eventually have to defer to the Commission unless 
it finds an "arbitrary and capricious" absence of good faith. us Ulti-
mately, the NRDC's chances to prevail seem dim. 
CONCLUSION 
NEPA offers the SEC an opportunity to take an imaginative and 
socially valuable view of its role as regulator of corporate accounta-
bility. The Commission has declined to take it. Clearly, investors 
and the public should have access to information useful in evaluat-
ing the environmental effects of activities of publicly owned corpo-
rations; yet, unfortunately, neither NEPA nor the Securities Acts 
appear to compel such a result. 
,,, See text at notes 73-78, supra. 
'''' 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1970). 
'" The leading case for substantive review ofNEPA is EDF u. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 
289 (8th Cir. 1972). For analysis of substantive review under NEPA see Comment, The 
Relationship Between Substantiue and Procedural Reuiew Under NEPA: A Case Study of 
SCRAP u. U.S., 4 ENV. AFr. 157 (1975). 
,,, NRDC v. SEC, 10 E.R.C. 1038 (D.D.C. 1977). The court did not ask the Commission to 
change its decision, merely to provide a fuller explanation of the Commission's rationale so 
that the court could then form an opinion on the sufficiency of the Commission's cost-benefit 
analysis. 
'" [d. 
,,, See text at notes 95-98, supra. 
'" Substantiue and Procedural Reuiew Under NEPA, supra note 144, at 170. 
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NEPA, as construed in Calvert Cliff's, prescribes a rigorous proce-
dural balancing of environmental and competing interests. How-
ever, once a federal agency has performed the balancing to the 
court's satisfaction, NEPA does not compel the agency to choose the 
environmentally favorable alternative. 
The Securities Laws set forth specific disclosure requirements for 
publicly owned corporations. The emphasis of these laws is financial 
protection of investors. Beyond the statutory disclosure require-
ments, the SEC has broad discretion to promulgate disclosure rules. 
Environmental disclosure would certainly have some prophylactic 
effect on corporate behavior. Some investors have indicated that 
environmental impact information would influence their invest-
ment decisionmaking. 
Yet the Commission has determined that it will not compel corpo-
rate environmental disclosure beyond a very limited scope. More-
over, it has decided not to extend environmental disclosure into the 
proxy regulations. This leaves a large gap in the dissemination of 
environmental information to those. intended to benefit most from 
the securities laws-members of the investing public. Both parties 
involved in this litigation have apparently ignored the potential 
for environmental disclosure through new proxy requirements. 
However, regardless of the outcome of the litigation, NEPA's 
procedural mandate has focused attention on the needs of the so-
cially concerned investor. Now the court's task is to determine 
whether the Commission has adequately balanced those needs 
against the competing, and as yet unclear, interests in overall ad-
ministrative efficiency and simplicity in corporate reporting. 
